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STATE OF WASHINGTON

v.
CHRISMAN
1.

SUMMARY:

Petr contends that the court belovl erroneously

held that an officer may not enter the premises of a person he
has arrested.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: · Resps were tried without a

jury and convicted of possession of more than 40 grams of
marijuana and a smaller amount of LSD.

.~~~~ n ~-.

i::t'..

The CA affirmed the

,OJ~~J,

AWi ~ .... ~-

1J.-J c.
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conviction, but the Washington S. Ct. reversed on the grounds

t _:

that evidence seized was ih violation of the Fourth Amendme nt . .
The evidence showed that defendant Overdahl was spotted by police
officer Daugherty walking out of a college dormitory with a half
gallon of gin.

Daugherty stopped Overdahl and requested his

identification, suspecting that Overdahl was under the age of 21.
Overdahl said he would have to go upstairs to get his
identification, but while they were waiting for the elevator, the
officer asked Overdahl how old he was.
he was 19.

Overdahl responded that

Upon arriving at Overdahl's dorm room, Overdahl went

into the room while the officer stood either in the open doorway
or just inside the room.

The room was occupied by petr and the

officer observed marijuana seeds and a small pipe lying on the
desk near him.

Concluding that the seeds were marijuana and the

pipe smelled of marijuana, Daughtery gave the two students their
Miranda rights and both students signed a waiver consenting to
the search of their room.

A search turned up even more amounts

of marijuana and LSD.
The Wash.S.Ct. accetped petr's contention that Daughtery's
initial warrantless examination of the seeds and the pipe
amounted to an unconstitutional search and that the evidence
seized should have been suppressed.

It concluded that the plain

view exception to searches did not apply.
that exception are,

The three elements of

(1) prior jus t ification for intrusion, (2)

inadvertent discovery of incrimina ting evidence, and (3)
immediate knowledge by the officer that he had evidence before
him.

In this case, there was no j ustification for Daughtery's
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presence in the dorm room.
l

•

1

Although Overdahl had been placed

under arrest at the time he reached his room, that arrest did not
give the officer the right to enter the room to conduct the
search.

There was no evidence that it was necessary for the

officer to enter the room to seize a weapon which might be used
in an assault or that the bottle of gin was about to be destroyed
or that Overdahl was going to attempt an escape.

It simply was

not necessary for the officer to enter the room to make certain
Overdahl secured his identification.
Judge Brachtenbach

~ s§ented.__

He claims that the majority

failed to explain why the officer was not entitled to keep the
arrested person within his sight.

It notes that the decision

below conflicts with other decisions holding that the police
,\....._.

officer may keep an arrested person within view.
Brown, 132 N.J. Super. 180 (1975).

See State v.

Other cases inidcate that if

a defendant is arrested at his dwelling and asks for access to
another room, the police may search that room before and a f ter
granting the request.
1122 (DCCA 1975).

E.g. United States v. Manson, 523 F.2d

Still other cases hold that if a defendant is

arrested in his horne and is allowed to go to another part of it
the police may accompany the defendant there and seize any
evidence in plain view.

E.g.,

F.2f 1094, 1102 (CA 2 1977).

United States v. DeStephano, 555
The rationale of these cases -

concern for police safety, avoidi ng possible destruction of
evidence, and discouraging potential escape attempts - is equally
persuasive when arrestee outside his dwelling requests to enter
it.

Those cases are

indistingui s~ able

from the situation here.

- 4 -

3.
dissent.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr partially tracts the reasoning of the

The first question presented is whether an individual

validly under arrest may be accompanied by the arresting officer
into another area without a warrant.

The answer in such cases is

clearly affirmative, as other cases have held.
question is based on exigent circumstances.

The second

Assuming the officer

was standing outside the premises , his observations of contraband
in plain view

constitute exigent circumstances which permit him

to enter the premises.

See Colorado v. Banister,

(1980}, State v. Patterson, - 192 Neb. 308 (1974}

u.s.

(authorizing an

officer who has reason to believe a crime is being commited
inside a residence to enter that residence}.
Resp criticizes petr for taking two conflicting positions,
the first based on the assumpatio11 that the police officer was in
the room and the second based on the assumption that he was
outside the room.
4.

DISCUSSION:

I recommend summary reversal essentially

for the reasons stated by the dissent.

If for no other reason

(A than personal safety, a police officer must surely be permitted
VJ to keep an arrested person under surveillance at all times.

To

require a police officer to stand outside the home of a person he
has lawfully arrested puts the officer in an incredibly
vulnerable position.

There is also the danger that the arrestee

will destroy evidence or make an

~scape

attempt.

Because the

officer was justifiably in the room of the arrestee in this case,
the plain view exception applies.
There is a response.
4/1/81

Knauss

Op in petn.
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PER CURIAM .

A

c ampu s

p o l ice

officer

at

Washington

State

University o bser ved a male youth, Carl Overdahl, exit a
s tudent dormitory carrying a half - gallon bottle of gin.
Because washington law forbids possession of alcoholic
b ever a ges

by

persons

under

21,

Wash.

Code

Rev.

§66.44.270, 1 and Overdahl appeaied to be under ag~, the
officer

stopped

him

and

asked

Overdahl

r e plied

that he would

room to obtain identification.

for

identification.

have to

return

to his

The officer accompanied

him. 2

The
located

room
on

respondent,

the

was

approximately

11th

Overdahl's

floor

of

roommate,

11
the

by

17

feet

dormitory.

and
The

was in the room when

luniversity regulations also forbade possession
of alcoholic beverages on university property.
Tr. 4.
2while waiting
for
the elevator,
the officer
asked Overdahl his age.
Overdahl responded that he was
19.
The respondent did not argue in the Washington
courts or in his Brief in Opposition here that this
admission eliminated the need for Overdahl to produce
identification a nd thus invalidates the visit to the
room.

.

'

..
J '

the officer and Overdahl arrived.

The officer remained

in

went

the

doorway

when

Overdahl

ins ide.

The

respondent became visibly nervous at the sight of the
officer.

While

waiting,

small pipe
training

lying

and

marijuana

a

table

the

in

he

pipe

was

observed
the

room. .

believed
of

a

seeds

the

type

and

a

From his

seeds

used

to

were
smoke

He then entered the room, went over to the

and

closely.

on

experience,

and

marijuana.
table,

the officer

examined

the

seeds

and

the

pipe

more

The pipe smelled of marijuana.

The officer informed both students of their rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426
indicated
officer
The

he was willing

to waive those

then asked whether

respondent

containing

handed

marijuana.

they

him
At

had

three
that

called by radio for assistance.
had arrived,

(1966), and each
The

any other drugs.

small

plastic

point,

the

bags

officer

Once a second officer

the students were told a

of the room would be necessary.

rights.

thorough search

The officers explained

to the two students that they had an absolute right to
insist

that

the

officers

that

they could · consent

also

informed

voluntary
respondent

and
and

first
to

the

obtain
search.

a

warrant but
The officers

them that any consent would
they

could

Overdahl

have to be

refuse

to

consent.

The

conferred

in

whispers,

then

3

No. 80-1349 , Washington v. Chrisman
(per curiam)
announced that they would consent.
more

marijuana

and

a

The search yielded

quantity

of

lysergic

acid

diethylamide (LSD).

An

information

charged

the

respondent

with

one

count of possessing more than 40 grams of marijuana and
one of possessing LSD,
Code §69 .50 .40l(c)

both

felonies under Wash.

(current version at Wash

§69.50.40l(d)) .3

A pretrial

motion

to

convicted

Washington
affirmed.

The
wash.

after

Court

2d

711,

trial.

On

appeal,

the

Appeals

upheld

the

search

and

Court

619

the

The respondent

24 wash. App. 385, 600 P.2d 1316

Supreme

Code

bench

a

of

Rev.

suppress

evidence seized in the room was denied.
was

Rev.

of

P.2d

washington

971

(1980).

(1979).

reversed.
It

held

94
that,

although the officer properly had placed OVerdahl under
arrest and
no right

followed him to

to enter

the

room.

the dormitory room,
There

was no

he had

indication

that Overdahl might seize a weapon or destroy evidence
(the gin bottle),
only exit
escape.

and ,

with

from the room,

the

there

officer

blocking

the

was no possibility of

Because no exigent circumstance

required

the

officer to enter the room and thus view its interior,

3overdahl was
tried
with
the respondent
for
possessing marijuana and also was convicted.
The
charges against him were dismissed while the case was
pending before the Supreme Court of washington.

No. 80-1349, ~shin~~on v. Chrisman
(per curiam)

.... "
his

-.

seizure

within

of

the

the

seeds

and

"plain

view"

exception

requirement;
"-•

tha t

the

exception

pipe

did

to

requires

not

the

fall

warrant
prior

some

justification for the officer's being where he sees the
contraband.

In

addition ,

because

the

respondent

and

Overdahl's consent to the subsequent searc h of room was
the

fruit

contraband

of

the

found

initial

officer's

during

that

search

en try,

should

have

the
been

suppressed as well.4

Three

Justices

dissented.

They

believed

it

was

fully reasonable for a police officer to keep OVerdahl,
an arrestee,
entered

the

legitimate
being

in sight at all times,

in

room.

reason,

the

The

including while he

officer

in the view of

place where he

therefore

had

the dissenters,

discovered contraband

a
for
in

"plain view."

The

"plain

view"

exception

to

the

warrant

requirement permits a law enforcement official to seize
what

clearly

discovered

in

is

evidence
a

place

or
where

contraband
the

when

officer

it

is

has

a

4Although
Art.
I,
§7
of
the
Washington .
Constitution provides
that
"[n]o person
shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law," the court never cited that
provision.
It did repeatedly refer to the Fourth
Amendment and cases construing it; therefore it is
clear the cour t did not rest its decision on an
independent state ground.

''

No . 80-1349, ~~shington v. Chrisman
(per curiam)

5

... .
legitimate right to be.

u.s.

443

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

(1971); Harris v. United States,

(1968).

Here,

concluded

the

the

Supreme

officer

had

Court

390 U.S. 234
washington

of

lawfully

placed

Overdahl

under arrest and therefore was authorized to follow him
to

his

room.

police

The

officer

Fourth

who

Amendment

lawfully

has

does

taken

not

a

deny

per son

a

in to

custody the authority to keep that individual in sight.
The

absence

of

an

affirmative

indication

that

a

particular arrestee might reach for a weapon or attempt
to

escape

does

not

v.

Mimms,

Pennsylvania
United

States
The

(1974).
search of

v.

vitiate
434 U.S.

Robinson,

officer

the room,

did

752,

Cf.

(1969).

763

106,

414

not

authority.
109-110

U.S.

(1977);

218,

undertake

a

See

234-236
complete

including areas completely out of

reach of the arrestee.

u.s.

that

Chimel v.
Rather,

California,

with

395

appropriate

restraint, he remained at the door, entering no farther
than was necessary to keep the arrested person in view.
It was only by chance that the officer observed on a
table

what

he

recognized

at

once

to

be

contraband.

This

is a classic case of evidence found

in plain view

when

a

and

policer

officer,

for

unrelated

entirely

legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's private
area.

Nothing
of

evidence

in the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizure
of

criminal

conduct

found

in

these

6
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(per curiam)
;

circumstances.
a

writ

of

Accordingly, we grant the petition for

certiorari,

vacate

Supreme Court of Washington,

the

and

judgment

remand

of

the case

the
for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

·. .;
.. ;-

-
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 6, 1981

Re:

No. 80-1349, Washington v. Chrisman

Dear Chief,
I agree with the proposed
you have circulated .

~curiam

Sincerely yours,

. .

~

The Chief Justice
- l

Copies to the Conference

.:§u:pumt ~ourl of flrt %ti±clt .§tatr.S'

.... .

~ftinghm, ~. ~· 20gtJl.~
CHA M BERS O F

JUSTIC E BYRON R . WHITE

May 6, 1981

Re:

80-1349 - Washington v. Chrisman

Dear Chief,
I

Per

am doubtful that I

Curiam

doctrine

because

beyond

its

it

can join your suggested
extends

previous

the

plain

bounds.

view

Perhaps

entry into the room could be justified on another
ground

but I

you use.

I

have my doubts

about

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Confe r ence

, .. y,t·•.

rationale

am considering writing a dissent.
Sincerely yours,

cpm

the

•

cqo-urt o-f tlyt 'J!Iniitb .$5taftg
~aslyington. ~· cq. 20~.J!..;l

.:§uprtutt

•

.. '
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

.•

..
May 6, 1981
Re:

No. 80-1349

Washington v.

Chr~srnan

Dear Chief,
Please join me.

Sincerely~~

The Chief Justice
cc:

'

...
. t

•
I

'

The Conference

Kr. Justice Stewart
Kr. Justice Marshall

Mr. Just1ce Blackmun
Ur. Just ice Powell
Mr. Just i ce R~ hnqulst
Mr. Just ~c e Stevens
Prom: Kr. Justice White
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I dissent.

In this summary

dispositio~

the Court

substantially expands the scope of the plain view doctrine and
wholly fails to acknowledge that expansion, characterizing this
as a "classic case" for application of the plain view doctrine.
Ante, at
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormitory
room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's observation
of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.

However, the issue in this case is whether,

having made that observation, the officer was authorized to enter
the dormitory room without a warrant to examine and seize those
items.l

The C~urt holds that this warrantless entry and seizure

was justified by the "plain view" doctrine.2

lThe officer testified at the suppression hearing that the
only reason he entered the room was to examine the seeds and the
pipe more closely and to seize them if he determined that they
were contraband. The pipe was made out of a seashell, so the
officer needed to examine it to determine whether it was a pipe
and whether it had been used for smoking marijuana. The seeds
were on a tray, apart from the pipe. The officer testified that
when he looked at these seeds from the doorway he thought they
were marijuana seeds. However, he found it difficult to explain
how he had been able to distinguish the seeds from other types of
seeds. Tr., 51. The officer explained that he had enter~d the
room for just one purpose--"to affirm my beliefs and to seize the
articles, if they were [contraband]." Tr., p. 44.
Footnote(s) 2 appear on following page(s).

.....

-2-

Inexplicably, the Court fails to acknowledge the distinction
between a police officer's observation of an object that is
inside a dwelling and his entry into the dwelling to seize that
object.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443, 468 (1971),

Justice Stewart clearly stated:
"[P)lain view alone is never enough to justify
the warrantless search and seizure of evidence.
This is simply a corollary of the familiar
principle, discussed above, that no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless search
or seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.'
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an
incriminating object is on premises belonging to
a criminal suspect may establish the fullest
possible measure of probable cause. But even
where the object is contraband, this Court has
repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule
that the police may not enter and make a
warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States,
268 u.s. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 u.s.
10, McDonald v. United States, 335 u.s. 451;
Jones v. United States, 357 u.s. 493, 497-498;
Chapman v. United States, 365 u.s. 610; Trupiano
v. United States, 334 u.s. 699." 403 u.s., at
468.3
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies only
after a lawful search is in progress.

The "initial intrusion"

2Although I do not entirely agree with the Supreme Court
of Washington's analysis in this case, I agree with its
conclusion that the plain view doctrine alone could not justify
this warrantless entry and seizure.
3one of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate
this point was Taylor v. United States, 268 u.s. 1 (1932). The
police officers in Taylor had looked through a small opening in a
garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the garage that they
believed contained contraband liquor. The officers could smell
the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this Court held
that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the
garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 469 n. 25 (1971).

-3must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to the warrant
requirement.

403

u.s.,

at 467.

The Court seeks to justify the officer's warrantless
intrusion into the dormitory room by relying solely on the plain
view doctrine.

It reasons that since the officer was entitled to

stand in the doorway to keep Overdahl in vie~he was also
entitled to enter the room to
were in plain view.4

investigat~

suspicious items that

On this reasoning, any officer passing by

4The Court relies on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and
Harris v. United States, 390 u.s. 234 (1968). Neither decision
supports the majority's analysis in this case.
In Harris the
Court emphasized that the officer had already lawfully entered
the car when he saw incriminating evidence inside the car and
seized it:
"Once the door had been lawfully opened, the
registration card, with the name of the robbery
victim on it, was plainly visible.
It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be introduced in evidence." 390 u.s., at
236 (emphasis added).
The broad wording of the second
apparently created some confusion
doctrine. One commentator remarked:

sentence quoted above has
regarding the plain view

"The hardest conceptual problem attending the
plain view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a
universal statement of the right of a policeman
to seize after seeing something in open view1 it
is rather a limited statement of that right in
one of its several instances--following a valid
intrusion. • •• The source of difficulty is that
the harbinger case, Harris v. United States,
spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure

..."Seeing
.

something

in open view does

not,

of

-4the open door of a home who saw incriminating evidence within
could enter the home and seize the evidence without a warrant.S
This would severely undercut the protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, for "'the physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.'"

Payton v. New York, __

u.s. __ , __

(1980), quoting

United States v. United States District Court, 407
(1972).

u.s.

297, 313

As I read our cases, if an officer who is legitimately

standing in the doorway of a home sees incrimating items inside

course, dispose ••• of the problem of crossing
constitutionally protected thresholds."
Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
'Search Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096
(1975).
See also 1 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2. 2 (a)
(1978).
Whatever confusion was created by this statement in Harris
should have been dispelled by the clear statement in Coolidge
. that "plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless
search and seizure of evidence." 403 u.s., at 468.
Sin this case it might be argued that the officer's
observations from the doorway did not even provide probable cause
to believe that there was contraband in the dormitory room. See
note 1, supra.
However, even if these observations did provide
probable cause, it is axiomatic that "no amount of probable cause
can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent
circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 468.
In many respects this case is similar to Colorado v.
Bannister,
u.s.
(1980), in which we held that an officer's
observation-of itemS:in plain view within a car did not violate
the occupant's Fourth Amendment rights.
u.s., at
n. 4.
The officer's observations could therefore~e used to establish
probable cause to search the car. However, it was also necessary
to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car.
We did not
seek to justify that intrusion by relying on the plain view
doctrine.
Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was
justified under the so-called "automobile exception" to the
warrant requirement.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42
(1970) 1 Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132 (1925).

-5-

the home, the plain view doctrine alone does not authorize him to
enter the home without a search warrant to seize those items.6
Accordingly, I dissent.

6There is no contention in this case that by entering the
dormitory building the officer had already entered respondent's
dwelling.
The officer himself testified at trial that a
dormitory room is considered a "private area" but that the public
has access to the hallway. Tr., at 37.

'.tt·

May 7, 1981

80-1349 washington v. Chrisman

Dear Chief:
I agree with your Per Curiam in this case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.:§u:prtl!U' <!Jtturl cf tltt ~nifelt .:§tatt.a'
~a-9'Jri.ngicn, ~·
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 8, 1981

Re:

80-1349 -Washington v. Chrisman

Dear Chief:
After reading Byron's circulation, I am firmly
convinced that it would be a mistake to dispose of this
case summarily.
I therefore will not be able to join
your proposed Per Curiam.
Because we have had our quota of Fourth Amendment
cases, my first preference is still to deny the
petition for certiorari. However, rather than have the
issues decided summarily, I would vote to grant.
In
the event that the case is granted, I would like to
suggest that the parties be directed to argue two
separate questions:
(1) Whether a warrantless entry into a dwelling
can be justified on the ground that contraband is
in plain view of an officer outside the dwelling;
and
(2) whether the "plain view" doctrine requires
not only that the object be plainly visible, but
also that it is plain that the officer has a right
to search it or to examine it.
With respect to the latter question, I suppose
there are at least three possible answers:
(a)
That the article merely be suspicious in
character, as was the case of the sea shell
here;
(b)
that there is probable cause to believe
that it is contraband; or

-2-

(c)
that there is a virtual certainty that
the item is associated with criminal
activity.
,/

Respectfully,

.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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RE:

No. 80-1349 Washington v. Chrisman

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent in the above.
Sincerely,
() -J~

// /l
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Justice White
cc: The Conference
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MEMORANDUM TO:

Mr. Justice Powell
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FROM:

Paul Cane

DATE:

May 11, 1981

RE:
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80-1349, washington v. Chr1s~.
This case, as you will recall, ~ ~ e o~

which the police officer accompanied a student

to-~~ d ~

dormitory room and stood in the doorway while th~ t
searched for his I.D. card.
'(

l

were spotted in the room and the officer seized
I

,

..

Seeds appearing to ~

t~e

-...,

state supreme court held that the search was invalid because
the officer had no right to stand in the doorway of the
room.

The Conference properly found that this was

incorrect, and the Chief has written a per curiam.
As BRW now points out, there is a problem in
the Chief's draft that no one focused on originally.

The

Chief does not state that exigent circumstances existed to
justify the entry once the officer (based on his observation
from the doorway) was confident that drugs were in the room.
Without a finding of exigent circumstances, as BRW says, the
officer should have had to get a warrant to enter the room.
.....

........ ...

~

-

""WU,__

~.....

._.

....l!ciba

-

Plainly there were exigent circumstances
here:

-

the roommate or others could have disposed of the

drugs if the officer had left the room.

But I think BRW is

correct that this needs to be made explicit in the opinion.

~

t

I

2.

Otherwise the "plain view" doctrine would be extended beyond
its present bounds.

P.W.C.
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A campus police officer at Washington State Universit~.A.n L .I~~
observed a male youth, Carl Overdahl, exit a student dorm~~
tory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washing~
ton law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by pe ons
..._tt
under 21, Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270/ and Overdal
1
peared to be under age, the officer stopped him aud asked fP! _• ~
identification. Overdahl replied that he would have to ~
turn to his room to obtain identification. The officer accompanied him. 2
The room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on
the 11th floor of the dormitory. The respondent, Overdahl's
roommate, was in the room when the officer and Overdahl
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl
went inside. The respondent became visibly uervous at the
sight of the officer.
While waiting, the officer observed seeds and a small pipe
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experience, he believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was
of a type used to smoke marihuana. He then went over to
1 Univen;ity regulations also forbade pos::;e~sion of alcoholic beverages
on univer:sity property. Tr. 4, :H.
u While wait.ing for the el«:>vator, tht> officer asked Overdahl his age.
Overdahl responded t.hat he was 19. The respond«:>nt did not argue in
the Washington courts or in his Brief in Opposition here that this ad~
mission climina.ted the n«:>ed for Overdahl to produce identification and
thus invalidates the visit to the room.
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the table and examined the seeds and the pipe more closely.
The pipe smelled of marihuana.
The officer informed both students of their rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966). and each indicat€d
he was willing to waive those rights. The officer then asked
whether they had any other drugs. The respondent handed
him three small plastic bags containing marihuana. At that
point, the officer called by radio for assistance. Once a second officer had arrived, the students were told a thorough
search of the room would be necessary. The officers explained to the two students that they had an absolute right
to insist that the officers first obt-ain a warrant but that they
could consent to the search. The officers also informed them
that any consent would have to be voluntary and they could
refuse to consent. The respondent and Overdahl conferred
in whispers, then announced that they would consent. The
search yielded more marihuana and a quantity of lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD).
An information charged the respondent with one count of
possessing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of possessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401
(c) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)) .3
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a bench
trial. On appeal. the Washingtou Court of Appeals upheld
the search and affirmed . 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316
(1979).
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. 94 Wash. 2d
711 , 619 P . 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer
properly had placed Overclahl under arrest and followed him
to the dormitory room, he had no right to enter the room.
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle), and, with the officer
blocking the only exit from the room, there was no possibility
a Ov<>rdahl was tri<>d with the r<>spondent for poo;sps::;ing marihuana and
also was convicted. The charges against him were dismissed while th&
case was pending before the Supreme Court of Washington .

.
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of escape. Because no exigent circumstance required the
officer to enter the room and thus view its interior, his seizure
of the seeds and the pipe did not fall within the "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement; that exception requires some prior justification for the officer's being where he
sees the contraband. In addition, because the respondent
and Overdahl's consent to the subsequent search of room was
the fruit of the officer's initial entry, the contraband found
during that search should have been suppressed as well. 4
Three Justices dissented. They believed it was fully reasonable for a police officer to keep Overdahl. an arrestee, in
sight at all times, including while he entered the room. The
officer therefore had a legitimate reason, in the view of the
dissenters, for being in the place where he discovered contraband in "plain view."
The "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement
permits a law enforcement officials to seize what clearly is
evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where
the officer has a legitimate right to be. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States,
390 U. S. 234 (1968). Here, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded the officer had lawfully placed Overdahl under
arrest and therefore was authorized to follow him to his room.
The Fourth Amendment does not deny a police officer who
lawfully has taken a person into custody the authority to
keep that individual ill sight. The absence of an affirmative
indication that a particular arrestee might reach for a weapon
or attempt to escape does not vitiate that authority. See
Pennsylvania v. Mirnms, 434 U. S. 106. 109-110 (1977);
United States v. Robin,son, 414 U. S. 218, 234- 236 (1974).
The officer did not undertake a complete search of the roomr
~Although Art. I, § 7 of t.hc Washington Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be distmbPd in his privatr affairs, or his home invaded , without authority of law." the eourt. never citPd that provision.
It did repeatedly refer to the Fomth AmendmPnt and cases construingit; therefore it is clear the court did not rest its decision on an independent state ground,

I
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including areas completely out of reach of the arrestee. Cf.
Chirnel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Rather, with
appropriate restraint, he remained at the door, entering no
farther than was necessary to keep the arrested person in
view. It was only by chance that the officer, after he had
entered the room, 5 observed on a table what he recognized at
once to be contraband. This is a classic case of evidence
found in plain view when a police officer. for unrelated and
entirely legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's private
area.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits seizure of
evidence of criminal conduct found 1n these circumstances.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari,
vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington,
and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
So ordered.

n The dissrnt misconrrivrs the facts shown by I he record when it ;;tate::;
the officer entered the room only after he ~aw the marihuana ~eeds and
the pipe. Post, at - . On the contrary, the oflicrr testifird that he
wa~ standing in the doorjamb, Tr. 9, 21, 31. 50, and tllf' Supreme Court
(lf Washington had no trouble concluding that ''[ t]hr police officer was in
the room at the time he observed the seeds and pipe." 94 Wash. 2d, al
716; 619 P. 2d, at 974 (empha;;is added). Whatever may be the validity
of a rule requiring a warrant to enter a dwelling initially when an offieer
obsPrves rvideuce from thr out~id('-a mattrr not at issue in this ea8<"the "initial intrusion" here occurred whru thr officrr followed an arw;tec
in his cu;;tody into the room, and only after that entry already had taken
place did he ser the contraband.
We also note that the trial judge fouud the re;;pondent's nre:senee in the
room and hb suspicion~ behavior indiratrd that. '·if [the ofliepr] departed
with the intention of obtaining a ~earch wanant, that thP contraband
would rapidly disapprar. Thi~ clearly con~titute~ exigent ~cumstan('e:; "
eliminating any nPed there otherwi;;e might havr be~1o"t1'6tai'ii a ;:;rant.
Record 20. Of rour~e, thi~ finding becamr irrPlevant once the Supreme
Court of Wa:;hiugton lwld th·tt thr offirer could nut Pven look mto the·
room.
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dissenting.
I dissent. In this summary disposition, the Court substantially expands the scope of the plaiu view doctrine and
wholly fails to acknowledge that expansion, characterizing
this as a "classic case" for application of the plain view doctrine. Ante, at - .
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormitory room to keep Overdahl in viev; ami that the officer's
observation of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point
did not violate the Fourth Ameudment. However, the issue
in this case is whether, having made that observation, the
officer was authorized to enter the dormitory room without a
warrant to examine and seize those items. 1 The Court holds
that this warrantless entry and seizure was justified by the
''plain view" cloctrine.2
JusTICE WHI'l'E,

1
The officer te::;tified at the ~llllJlrP;;~;ion bearing that the on]~· rea~Son
·he entered the room was to examine the seed;; and the pipe more closely
and to ~Pize them if he determined that they werr contraband. Thr pipe
wa::; made out of a ~ea<;hell, ~o t hr officrr nreded to examine it to drtermine
whether it wa::; a pipe and whet her it had been u~rd for smoking mari~
!mana. The serd~ Wl·r·e 011 a tray, apart from the pipe. The officer
tecitified that whrn hr looked at thr~e ~rrd~ from the doorway he thought
t!H'Y were marihuana ~eed~. Howewr, hl' found it diffiC'ult to explain
how he had bren abll' to di::;tingui~h the :;reds from other type~ of ::;eecl::;.
Tr., 51. The officer explained that hP had t•ntNed the room for jn~t one
purpo::;e-"to aii-irm m~· belief::; and to seize the article::;, if they were
'[contraband]." Tr., p. 44.
2
Although I do not entirely agree with the Supreme Court of Wa::;h-

I

f

2
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Inexplicably, the Court fails to acknowledge the distinctiorl
between a police officer's observation of an object that is inside a dwelling and his entry into the dwelling to seize thati
object. In Coolidge v. l\'ew Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
JusTICE RTEWART clearly stated:
"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary
of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount
of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or'
seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is
011 premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish
the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even
where the object is contraband. this Court has repeatedly
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may Hot
enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor Y. United
States, 286 U. S. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451; Jones v.
United States, 357 U. S. 493. 497-498; Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610; Trupiano v. United States,
334 U. S. 699." 403 U. S., at 468. 3
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies
only after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intrusion" must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to
the warrant requireme11t. 403 U. S .. at 467.
The Court seeks to justify the officer's warrantless intru~
ingtou'::: anab·si::> in thi:; cu~e, I agree with it~ ronclusion tl111t thr plain
view dortrine alone could not justify thi::l warrantlr:<s entry and ~Pizure.
8 One of the many ca;;es c·ited iu Coolidge to illustratf' thi~ point wa~
'l'aylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (19:~2). Tlw polirr officer,.; in 1'aylur
had looked through a small opening in a gurngt' and had srPn cardboard
case~ inf'idr the garagr that thPy brlievrd contained rontrnband liquor.
The officpr~ rould snwll the odor of whiskPy rom in~~: from the guragt•. Yet
thi~ Court held thnt they had violatrd thr Fomth Am('!Jclment I>~· Pntt>ring ·
the garage and :;eizing tllP whi~kP~' without obtaining a warrant. See·
Coolidye Y; New Ilampshii·e, .4o:vu. 8 .. 443, 469 , 11 .. 25 (19il) ..
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:sion into the dormitory room by relying solely on the plain
view doctrine. It reasons that since the officer wa.s entitled
to stand iu the doorway to keep Overdahl in view. he was
also entitled to enter the room to investigate suspicious items
that wPre in plain view. 4 On this reasoning, any officer passThe Court relies on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, a11d Harri.s v.
United States. 390 U. S. 234 (196~). Neither deci:sion support:; the
Court's analysis in this case. Harris involved an automobile that had
been impounded and towed to a police station. The window:; of the car
were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain. The Court
held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police officer to
obtain a warrant before opening the door of the car to roll up the car
window, for thi:s was :simply "a mea:;ure taken to protect the car while it
was in police custody." 390 U. S., at 236. Harris did not rely on the
plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless intrusion into the automobile.
The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered
the· cal' when he sa.w incriminating evidence in plain view in:side tlw car
and seized it:
"Once the door lutd lawfull:I.J beeu opened. the regi:;tration cnrd, with
the name of the robber~' victim on it, wa:; plainly vi:sible. It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to :seizure and
may be introduced in evidence." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The broad wording of the second sentence quoted above has apparently
created some confusion regnrding the plain view doctrine. One commentator remarked:
"The hardest conceptual problrm nttending thr J>lain view doctrine. is
to grasp that it is not a uuiver:sal statement of the right of a policeman
to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited statement of that right in one of its severul instance:s-following a valid intrusion . . . . The source of difficult.v i~ thnt the harbinger case, Ha·rris v.
United States, spoke care]p,;sly in Hniver:;al term~: 'It ha,; long br('fl settled
that objects falling in the plain view of an otneer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to ~t>izurc ... .'
"SPeing something in opeu view does not, of cour~e. di:;pose ... of the
problem of cro~:;ing eonstitutionally protected thrrsholds."
Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 'Search
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rt•v. 1047, 1096 (1975). See
nlso 1 W . LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 (a) (197~). Thi~ problem of
"crossing eon~titutionall~' protected thre:sholds" witho11t H warrant i:; ea:sily
resolved if the so-called "automobile excrption" to the warrant rP<JUiremcnt applies, for that exception ju:;tifies the officer's warrautle::;:; ~ntry
4

4
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ing by the open door of a home who saw incriminating evidence within could enter the home alld seize the evidence
without a warrant.u This would severely undercut the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for "the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573. 585-586 (1980), quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 313
(1972). As I read our cases, if an officer who is legitimately
standing in the doorway of a home sees incriminating items
inside the home, the pla.in view doctrine alone does not authorize him to eHter the home without a search warrant to
seize those items. 6
Accordingly, I dissent.

into the automobile to st'ize contraband in plain view inside th<' car.
S<'e 11. 5, iufra.
sIn this caRe it might be nrgued that the offiecr'i:i observations from the
doorway did 110t even provide· probnble cause to believe that ther(' was
contrabund in the dormitory room. See n. 1, supra. HoweYer, Pven if
these observations did providE' probuble cau::;e, it is axiomatic thut "no
amount of probable cause cun jwstify u warnmtle8s search or seizure
ab~ent 'E'xigPnt circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Ham]Jshire, supra, at
468.
Iu many respects thi~ cuse is similnr to Colorado v. Banlti13tPr. U. S. ( 1980), in which we held that un officE'r's observutiou of items
in pia in view within a ear did not violate the oceupant'10 Fourth Amendment rights. U. S., at - , n. 4. Tlw officer's ob~erwttions eould
therefore be usE'd to establi~h probable cau:se to 10earrh thE' car. However,
it was also neres~ary to justify the wa rrantle~s int ru,;ion into the rar. We
did not seek to ju;otify that intru~ion by relying on the plaiu view doetrine.
Rather, we held that the warrantle,;~ entr~· was ju~tified under the S"lralled "automobilt' exception" to the warrant requirement. See Chambersv. Mamney , 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. Uuited Stat~s, 267 U.S. 132
( 1925).
8 There is no <'Oitlention iu thi~ case that b~· pntering thr dormitory
building the officer had alrPad~· entE'red re~pondent'~ dwelling. The officer·
himself testified at tri::tl that a dormitor~· room is couHiclered a "private·
are!l" but lhat the public has acce~:; lo the hallway. Tr., at 37.
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JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the result.
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I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer
had a right to stand in the doorway of respondent's dormitory
room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's observation
of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.

Yet I do not agree that the officer entered

the room by standing in the doorway.

The officer's subsequent

warrantless entry into the room to seize the seeds and pipe
cannot be justified by relying solely on the plain view doctrine.
Therefore, I would vacate the judgment and remand the case to
enable the Supreme Court of Washington to determine whether
exigent circumstances justified this warrantless entry and
whether the office r had probable cause to believe that the items
he saw inside the room were contraband.
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had
not physically entered the room while he was observing Overdahl,
and that he had subsequently entered the room solely to confirm
his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he had observed
from the doorway were marihuana seeds and a seashell pipe that
had been used to smoke marihuana.

The officer's uncontradicted

testimony establishes that he remained in the doorway until he
entered the room to examine the seeds and pipe.l

MAY 1987

The Court

Footnote(s) 1 appear on following page(s).
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apparently has determined as a matter of law that any police
officer who stands in the open doorway of a home has "entered"
the home.

I disagree, for under the Court's analysis a police

officer may intrude into a home without a warrant to seize any
incriminating evidence or contraband that he is able to see while
standing in the doorway.
The plain view doctrine clearly does not authorize an
officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contraband
merely because the contraband was visible from outside the
dwelling.

As Justice Stewart stated in Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403

u.s. 443

(1971):

"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify
lThe

officer

testified:

"I stood in the doorway without entering,
actually physically entering the room . • • . I was
standing against the doorjamb. • •• I was not in
the room. I was in the doorway." Tr. 7, 9, 21.
The trial court stated in its memorandum opinon that "the
officer stood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl] ," observed
the seashell pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "then
entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds closely."
Record 18 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the court of appeals
stated: "Prior to entering the room, the officer saw from his
vantage point in the doorway what he believed to be contraband.
Only at that time, did he cross the threshold and seize the pipe
and marlJUana seeds."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 27 (emphasis
added) •
As I read the Supreme Court of Washington's op1n1on, the
court held that whether or not the officer had physically entered
the room by standing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway
was sufficiently intrusive that his observations were unlawful
unless he could justify his presence. The court concluded that
the officer should have remained outside the room, since there
was no indication that Overdahl was likely to escape, destroy
evidence, or seize a weapon.

-3-

the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is
simply a corollary of the familiar principle
discussed above, that no amount of probable cause
can justify a warrantless search or seizure
absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating
object is on premises belonging to a criminal
suspect may establish the fullest possible
measure of probable cause. But even where the
object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly
stated and enforced the basic rule that the
police may not enter and make a warrantless
seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 u.s. 1:
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451: Jones v. United
States, 357 u.s. 493, 497-498: Chapman v. United
States, 365 u.s. 610: Trupiano v. United States,
334 u.s. 699." 403 u.s., at 468.2
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies only
after a lawful search is in progress.

The "initial intrusion"

must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to the warrant
requirement.

403

u.s.,

at 467.

If a police officer passing by the open door of a home sees
incriminating evidence within the home, his observations may
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

Yet

the officer may not enter the home without a warrant unless an
exception to the warrant requirement applies.3

This rule is

2one of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate
this point was Taylor v. United States, 286 u.s. 1 (1932). The
police officers in Taylor had looked through a small opening in a
garage and had seen cardboard cases inside the garage that they
believed contained contraband liquor. The officers could smell
the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet this Court held
that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the
garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant.
3There is no contention in this case that by entering the
dormitory building the officer had already entered respondent's
dwelling.
The officer himself testified at trial that a
dormitory room is considered a "private area" but that the public

-4fully supported by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and Harris
v. United States, 390

u.s.

has access to the hallway.

234 (1968) .4

Any contrary rule would

Tr. 37.

4Harris v. United States involved an automobile that had
been impounded and towed to a police station. The windows of the
car were open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain.
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the
police officer to obtain a warrant before opening the door of the
car to roll up the car window, for this was simply "a measure
taken to protect the car while it was in police custody."
390
u.s., at 236. Harris did not rely on the plain view doctrine to
justify the warrantless intrusion into the automobile. The Court
emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully entered
the car when he saw incriminating evidence in plain view inside
the car and seized it:
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the
registration card, with the name of the robbery
victim on it, was plainly visible.
It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be
introduced
in evidence."
Ibid.
(emphasis added) •
The broad wording of the second
apparently created some confusion
doctrine. One commentator remarked:

sentence quoted above has
regarding the plain view

"The hardest conceptual problem attending the
plain view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a
universal statement of the right of a policeman
to seize after seeing something in open view; it
is rather a limited statement of that right in
one of its several instances--following a valid
intrusion • • . • The source of difficulty is that
the harbinger case, Harris v. United States,
spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure
I

"Seeing something in open view does not, of
course, dispose • • • of the problem of crossing
constitutionally protected thresholds."

-5severely undercut the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment, for "the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-586 {1980), quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407

u.s.

297, 313 {1972).

I do not read the Court's opinion as conflicting with this
general analysis.5 The Court simply contends that here the
officer had already lawfully entered the room to observe
Overdahl.

Apparently the Court would approach this case quite

Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
'Search Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096
See also 1 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 2.2{a)
{1975).
{1978).
This
problem
of
"crossing
constitutionally
protected
thresholds" without a warrant is easily resolved if the so-called
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement applies, for
that exception justifies a warrantless entry into the automobile
to seize contraband in plain view inside the car. In Colorado v.
Bannister,
u.s.
{1980), for example, we held that an
officer's observation of items in plain view inside a car did not
violate the occupant's Fourth Amendment rights.
u.s., at
n. 4.
The officer's observations could therefore be used to
establish probable cause to search the car.
Yet it was also
necessary to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We
did not seek to justify that intrusion by relying on the plain
view doctrine.
Rather, we held that the warrantless entry was
justified under
the "automobile exception"
to the warrant
requirement.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42 {1970);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 {1925).
5In fact, the Court explains that "[t]he 'plain view'
exception to the warrant requirement permits a law enforcement
official to seize what clearly is evidence or contraband when it
is discovered in a place where the officer has a legitimate right
to be."
Ante, at
{emphasis added) •
Thus, the plain view
doctrine justifies a-warrantless seizure of contraband only if
the officer lawfully enters the premises where the contraband is
located.

-6-

differently if the officer had seen these items through an open
window or if the officer had been standing in the hallway rather
than the doorway.
As the Court observes, ante, at
the warrant requirement may apply here.

, n. 5, an exception to
The trial court found

that exigent circumstances justified the officer's warrantless
entry into the room to seize the seeds and the pipe.

The Supreme

Court of Washington did not review this finding.6 Nor did it
consider whether the officer's observations from the doorway
provided him with probable cause to believe that the items he had
observed were contraband.
Although the Court asserts that the officer observed items
that "he recognized at once to be contraband," ante, at

, the

record suggests that the officer merely suspected that the items
he saw were contraband.

The officer saw a seashell and some

seeds on a tray inside the room.

He suspected that the seashell

had been used as a marihuana pipe, since he had seen seashell
pipes before and one end of this seashell was black.

He thought

6The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that it was
unnecessary for the officer to intrude into the room to observe
Overdahl.
However, it did not consider whether there were
exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless entry to seize
the seeds and the pipe.
The court of appeals concluded: "[E]xigent circumstances
existed here. Because the drugs could have been readily disposed
of while the police officer was trying to obtain a search
warrant, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify the
[warrantless] seizure." App. to Pet. for Cert. 29. The court of
appeals recognized that the "preintrusion 'open view' observation
from the doorway of Overdahl's room" did not justify the
warrantless entry into the room. Ibid.

-7the seeds looked like marihuana seeds.

Yet he found it difficult

to explain how he had been able to distinguish these seeds from
other types of seeds, particularly from a distance.
51-53.

Tr. 16-17,

The officer testified that he entered the room to inspect

the seeds and the seashell and to seize these articles if they
were contraband.?

Only after he had examined the seeds more

closely, picked up the pipe, smelled the contents of the pipe,
and concluded that the pipe had been used to smoke marijuana, did
the officer advise Overdahl and respondent of their rights.8
Because I agree that the Supreme Court of washington erred
in holding that the officer was not entitled to stand in the

7The officer did not
to keep a closer watch on
only reason he had entered
the pipe more closely and
they were contraband:

suggest that he had entered the room
Overdahl.
Rather, he stated that the
the room was to examine the seeds and
to seize them if he determined that

A: "I went, entered in to affirm my beliefs and
to seize the articles if they were [contraband]."

Q: "So, you went in to inspect the seeds and the
pipe, for further inspections and for no other
purpose? ••• There was no other purpose?"
A: "No, sir." Tr. 44.
8The

officer

testified:

"I then entered the room, walked directly to the
seeds, I looked at them.
I walked past them.
I
walked over to the desk and picked up the pipe,
smelled the contents of the pipe, which was
similar to that of marijuana that I had been in
contact with in the past.
I then turned and
stated
to
the
individuals
that
before
we
proceeded any farther I must advise them of their
rights." Tr. 19-20.

-adoorway to keep Overdahl in view, I would vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

.
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JusTICf WHITE, concurring in the result.
I do not quarrel with the Court's assertion that the officer
had a right to stl}nd in the doorway of respondent's dormitory room to keep Overdahl in view and that the officer's
observatipn of the seeds and pipe from that vantage point
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Yet I do not agree
that the officer entered the room by standing in the doorway.
The officer's subs(;lquent warrantless entry into the room to
seize the seeds and pipe cannot be justified by relying solely
on the plain view doctrine. Therefore, I would · vacate the
judgment and remand the case to enable the Supreme Court
of Washington to determine whether exigent circumstances
justified this warrantless entry and whether the officer had
probable cause to believe that the items he saw inside the
room were contraband.
The officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had
not physically entered the room while he was observing Overdahl, and that he had subsequently entered the room solely
to confirm his suspicion that the seeds and the seashell he
had observed from the doorway were marihuana seeds and
a seashell pipe that had been used to smoke marihuana.
The officer's uncontradicted testimony establishes that he remained' in the doorway until he entered the room to examine
the seeds and pipe.1 The Court apparently has determined
The officer testified :
"I stood in the doorway without entering, actually physically entering the
t

2
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as a matter of law that any police officer who stauds in the
open doorway of a home has "eu tered" the home. I dis~
agree, for under the Court's analysis a police officer may intrude into a home without a warrant to seize any incrimiuating evidence or contraband that he is able to see while
standing in the doorway.
The plain view doctrine clearly does not authorize an officer to enter a dwelling without a warrant to seize contrabaud
merely because the contraband was visible from outside the
dwelling. As JusTICE STEWART stated in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971):
"[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the war~
rantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary
of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount
of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent 'exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible
testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is
on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish
the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even
where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not
enter and make a warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United
room. . . . I was standing against the doorjamb. . . . I was not in
the room. I was in the doorway." Tr. 7, 9, 21.
The trial court stated in it~:; memorandum opinion that "the offict>r
stood in the doorway, and watched [Overdahl]," observed the sea:;hell
pipe and the seeds from the doorway, and "then entered the room and
tlxamined the pipe nnd r;eeds cloi:iely." Record 18 (empha10is added).
Similnrly, the court of nppenl:; stated: "Prior to entering the room, the
officer saw from his vantage point in the doorway what he believed to be
contraband. Only at that time, did he <Toss the threshold and ;;eize the
pipe and marijuana seeds." App. to Pet. for Cert. 27 (emphasiti udded).
As I read the Supreme Court of Washington 's opinion, the court held
that whether or not the officer had 11hysically entered the room by standing in the doorway, his presence in the doorway was sufficiently intru~:;ive
that hi~ observntions were unlawful unleHl:l he co11ld justify his presence.
The court concluded that tlw ofiieer :;hould have remained outt>ide the
room, since there was no indication that Overdahl was likely to escape,
destroy evidence, or seize a weapon.

WASHfN6'f0N v, €HRISMAN

States, 286 U. S. 1; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451; Jones v.
United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-498; Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610; Trupiano v. United States,
403 U. S., at 468. 2
Coolidge emphasized that the plain view doctrine applies
only after a lawful search is in progress. The "initial intrusion" must be justified by a warrant or by an exception to
the warrant requirement. 403 U. S., at 467.
If a police officer passing by the open door of a home sees
incriminating evidence within the home, his observation may
provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.
Yet the officer may not enter the horne without a warrant
unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.3
'rhis rule is fully supported by Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
s~tpra, and Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968). 4
One of the many cases cited in Coolidge to illustrate this point was
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932). The police officers in Taylor
2

had looked through a small opening in a garage and had seen cardboard
cases inside the garage that they believed contained contraband liquor.
The officers could sinell the odor of whiskey coming from the garage. Yet
this Court held that they had violated the Fourth Amendment by entering
the garage and seizing the whiskey without obtaining a warrant.
8 There is no contention in this case that by entering the dormitory
building the officer had alfeady entered respondent's dwelling. The officer
him~;clf t.estified at trial that a dormitory room is considered a "private
area" but that the public has t~ccess to the hallway. Tr. 37.
4 Harris v. United States involved an t~utomobile that had been impounded and towed to a police sta tion . The windows of the car were
open, the doors were unlocked, and it had begun to rain . The Court
held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police officer to
obtnin a warrant before opening the door of the car to roll up the car
window, for this was simply "n measure taken to protect the rar whil<·
it was in police custody." 390 U. S., at 236. Harl'i,s did not rely on the
plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless intru~;ion into the automobile.
The Court emphasized that the police officer had already lawfully enterf'd
the car when he saw im·riminating f'vidence in plain view insidE' the car
and seized it:
"Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with
the natne of the robbery viptim on it, was plainly visible. It has lont

4
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Any contrary rule would severely undercut the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, for "the 'physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wordiBg of
the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573, 585-586 (1980), quoting United States v.
United States District Court 407 U. S. 297, 313 (1972).
I do not read the Court's opinion as conflicting with this
genpral analysis. 5 The Court simply contends that here the
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be introduced in evidence." Ibid. (emphasis added).
The broad wording of the second sentence quoted above has apparently
created some confusion regarding the plain view ·doctrine. One commentator remarked:
"The hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view doctrine is
to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the right of a policeman
to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited statemt-nt of that right in one of its several instances-following a valid intrusion. . . . The source of difficulty is that the harbinger case, Harris v.
United States, spoke carelessly in universal terms: 'It has long been settled
that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure ... .'
"Seeing something in open view does not, 'Of course, dispose ... of the
problem of crossing constitutionally protected thresholds."
Moylan, "The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 'Search
Incident' Geography Battle," 26 Mercer L. Rev. 1047, 1096 (1975). See
also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 (a) (1978).
Thi~> problem of "cros~>ing constitutionally protPctt-d thrt-sholds" without
a warrant is easily resolved if the so-culled "automobile exception" to
the warrant requirernt>nt appliP~, for that exception justifit>~> a warranties~>
entry into the automobile to seize contraLand in plain view in:;ide the car.
In Colorado v. Bamzister, U. S. (1900), for example, we held
that an officer's observation of items in plain view inside a car did not
violate the occupant'~ Fourth Amendment rights . U. S., at - , n. 4.
The officer's observations could therefore be u:;ed to e:;tabli~>h probable
cau~>e to search the car. Yet it wa~> al::;o nece&:;ary to justify the warrantless intrusion into the car. We did not ~eek to ju~tify that intrusion
by relying on the plain view doctrine. HHther, we held that the warrant)e&:; entry was ju:;tified under the "automobile exct>ption" to the warrant
requirement. See Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v.
Uuited States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
6 In fact, t!Je Court exJ)iaiu~> thaL "[t]he 'plain view' exception to the·

•
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officer had already lawfully entered the room to observe Overdahl. Apparently the Court would approach this case quite
differently if the officer had seen these items through an
open window or if the officer had been standing in the hallway rather than the doorway.
As the Court observes, ante, at - , n. 5, an exception to
the warrant requirement may a.pply here. The trial court
found that exigent circumstances justified the officer's warrantless entry into the room to seize the seeds and the pipe.
The Supreme Court of Washington did not review this finding.6 Nor did it consider whether the officer's c:bservations
from the doorway provided him with probable cause to believe that the items he had observed were con trabaud.
Although the Court asserts that the officer observed items
that "he recognized at once to be contrabaud" ante, at-, the
record suggests that the officer merely suspected that the
items he saw were contraband. The officer saw a seashell and
some seeds on a tray inside the room. He suspected that the
seashell had been used as a marihuana pipe since he had seen
seashell pipes before and one end of this seashell was black.
He thought the seeds looked like marihuana seeds. Yet h~
.Jou11d it difficult to explain how he had been able to distinwarrant requirement permits a law enforcement official to seize what
clearly i;; evidence or constraband when it is discovered iu a place where
the officer has a leyitirnate right to be." Ante, at (emphasis added).
Thus, the plain view doctrine justifies a warrantless !:ieizure or contraband
only if the officer lawfully enters the premi~:;es where the contraband is
located.
6 The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that it was unneces:>ary
for the officer to intrude into the room to observe Overdahl. However,
it did uot con:;ider whether there were exigent circumstances that justifiecl
a warrantle;s entry to seize the :;eed:; and the pipe.
The court or appeals concluded: "[E] xigent circumstances existed here.
l3ecause the drugs could have been readily disposed of while the police
officer was trying to obtain a search warrant, sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify the [warrantless] seizure." App. to Pet. fof'
Cert. 29. The court of appeals recognized that the "preintrusion 'open
view' observation from the doorway of Overdahl's room" did not ju;;tify.th~ wartantle~>S entry intQ th~ roQI}l, Ibid ,

6
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guish these seeds from other types of seeds, particularly from
a dista11ce. Tr. 16-17, 51-53. The officer testified that he
entered the room to inspect the seeds and the seashell and to
seize these articles if they were contraband. 7 Only after he
had examined the seeds more closely, picked up the pipe,
smelled the contents of the pipe, and concluded that the pipe
had been used to smoke marihuana, did the officer advise
Overdahl and respondent of their rights. 8
Because I agree that the Supreme Court of Washington
erred in holding that the officer was not entitled to stand in
the doorway to keep Overdahl in view, I would vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this o:pipiop,

7 The officer did not suggest that he had entered the room to keep a
closer watch on Overdahl. Rather, he stated that the only reason he
had entered the room was to examine the seeds and the pipe more clol:!ely
and to seize them if he determined that they were contraband:
A: "I went, entered in to affirm my beliefs and to seize the articles if
they were [contraband]. ..."
Q: "So, you went in to inspect the seeds and the pipe, for further inspection~ and for no other purpose? . . • There was no other purpose?"
A: "No, l:iir." Tr. 44.
s The officer testified:
"I then entered the room, walked directly to the seeds, I looked at them,
I walked past them . I walked over to the desk and picked up the pipe,
11melled the contents of the pipe, which was similar to that of marijuana
that I had been in contact with in the past. I then turned and stated
to the individuals that before we proceeded any farther I must advise
them of their rights." Tr. 19-20.
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June 10, 1981
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE:

i

No. 80-1349,

~ashinqton

v. Chrisman

In the interest of getting this case moving , I am
proposing a modification. Byron has raised an
interesting issue regarding the scope of the "plain
view" doctrine--i.e., whether a police officer may enter
a dwelling without a warrant when he sees contraband
from the outside . I believe we should address this
problem at some point, but this is probably not the case
in which to do so . First, this is a dormitory room; we
would be better off reaching this issue for the first
time in the context of a private home. Second, the
Washington Supreme Court expressly held that the officer
was already inside the room when he first observed the
contrab and ; thus, the issue is not squarely presented.
Third, since Overdahl was under arrest, the officer
could have followed him into the room in any event to
maintain the arrest custody.
Although I continue to believe going over to the
table would . have been permissible even if the officer
had first noticed the marijuana wh ile standing
completely outside the dormitory room--and although four
have joined on this point--! am prepared to yield to
avoid granting this case. My primary concern from the
start--with which no one seems to have disagreed--has
been the Washington Supreme Court's holding that a
police officer may not keep a lawfully arrested person
in sight absent some affirmative indication that his
safety is endangered, that evidence might be destroyed,
or that the arrestee might escape.
I therefore am
willing to modify my per curiam to hold only that the
officer's observation of the pipe and seeds was
permissible. The opinion would then vacate and remand,
leaving the respondent free to raise Byron's point--or
the other elements of "plain view"--on remand.
I attach a typed revidion of the final two
paragraphs that decides the
case along these lines.
I
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PER CuRIAM.

A c:>m pus police officer at vVashington State tTniversity
observed a male youth, Carl Overdahl. exit a stud ent uormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washington law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons
under 21, Wash. Rev. Code § 66.4.4.270, 1 and Overda.hl appeared to be under age, the officer stopped him and asked for
jdentification. Overdahl replied that he would have to return to his room to obtain identification. The officer accompanied him.%
The room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on
the 11th floor of the dormit<;>ry. The respondent. Overdahl's
roommate, was in the roon1 when the officer and OverdaJ1l
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl
went inside. The respondent became visibly nervous at the
sight of the officer.
Vi7hile waiting. the officer observed seeds and a small pipe
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experience, he believed the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was
of a type used to smoke marihuana. He thell "·ent over to
1 University regubt.ion~ also forb:Hle possPssion of alcoholic bcwrages
on uniYersity propcr1~·. Tr. 4, :34.
2 While waiting for the rh-Yator, the officer a~kC'd o,·erdahl his age.
o,·erdahl rpsponded t.hat he was 19. The respondent did not argue in
the Washington eonrts or in his Brief in Opposition bere that this ad·
mi ;:::;ion eliminated the need for 01·ercJab[ to prod\H'C idl'ntific;dion am!
thus im·alidates the Yi ~ it to the room.
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the table and examined the sec·ds and the pipe more dosely.
The pipe smrllt•d of marihuana.
The officer inforwed both students of their rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966), and each indicated
he was willing to waive those rights. The officer then :u:ked
wlwther they had any other drugs. The respondent handed
him three small plastic bags containing marihuana. At 1l1at
point, the officer called by r&diu for n~:-isbnee. On('C a second officer had arrived. the students were tDld a thorough
~r~,!dl of the room '\oulcl be nece~·~:~ry. The offic·\'rs PXplnilH:tl t.u tl1e two students that they had an :::Lsolute right
to insist. that the officers nrst obtain a warrant but t.hat tl1cy
could eunse11t to the search . The officers also informed them
that ~wy consent ·wou ld ha.ve to be voluntary an d they could
refuse to consent. The respondent and Overdahl conferred
in whic:pers. then announce d that they wou ld consent. The
:o;earch yielded more marihuana and a quantity of lysergic
acid diethylamide (LSD).
An information charged the r espon dent with one count of
possessing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of possessing LSD, both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401
(c) (current version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)). 8
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a b ench
trial. On appeal. the \·r ashington Court of Appeals upheld
the search and affirmed. 24 Wash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316
(1979).
The Supreme Court of Washii1gton rev ersed. 94 Wash. 2d
711 , 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer
properly had placed Overdahl under arrest and followed him
to the dormitory room, he had no right to enter the room.
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle). and. with the officer
blocking the only exit from the room, there \\·as no possibility
~ Overda hl was trit>d with the respondent for poss\•s::;ing marihuana and
also was tonvieted. The charges against- him wen' dismissed while tht>case was pend ing before the Supreme Court. of ·washington.

'
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o:l escape. Because no exigen t circumstance required the
officer to enter the room all d thus view its interior. hi s seizure
of the sepds and the pipe did not fall within the ''plai n view"
exc:eption to the warrant requ iremen t; tha t exception requires some prior justification for the officer's bring where he
sePs the contraband. In addition . because the rrsponclen t
an J On:rduhl's consent to the subsequent sC'arch of room \\US
the fruit uf the •·ffiC'fr's initi<Jl Pntry, tlH' C'CJtdr::Jhttd found
duriJJg that ~ -.. reh should have }J( en suppn··.-.C'd a.c: \\·dl. 4
Three .Tustiees dis::-eiH<'d. They belien'd it \l'clS full)· rc:lH•nJble for a police offr·er to krep On·r·l .. lJ]_ ::111 :trrt·,l<'l', in
sight at all times. incJuding while he entered the room. The
offieer therefore had a lL~gitima te rcusl1n, in the vi<.·"· of the
disEC'nters. for being in the place where hr dis(~overPd ('OJJtrabl:llid in "plain view ."
v·ie
be l iev e
th e
Supreme
Cou r t
of
Washington
erred
in
holding
tha t
the
o ff icer h aH no r ight t o s t a nd in t he
doo rwa y.
That c ourt conclude d that the
o f fic e r, ha ving lawfully placed Overdahl
u nder arrest, could follow him to his room.
The Fourth Amendment does not deny a police
officer who law fully has taken a per son
into custody the authority to keep that
individual in sight.
The absence of an
affirmative indication that a particular
arrestee might reach for a weapon, destroy
evidence, or escape does not vitiate that
authority.
See PennSf?lvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106,109-110 (197 ) ; United States v.
Robin s on, 414 U.S. 218, 234-236 (1974).
Here,
the
officer
d id
not,
upon
his
arrival, undertake a complete search of the
Although Art. I, § 7 of ihe "ra:;hington Conf;titution provides that
"[n]o pe r~ mr f;hall be dist.urbP<l in his pri\·ate nffairs, or hi s homl' inYnd<'d, without. auth ority of law," till' (·ourt nr\·Pr ('itt>d that provision.
It did TPJWa tedly r Pfer to tlw Fonrth Anl t>!ldmr nt. nnd ca,; t>.~ (·onstruingit ; therefore it. is d ear the court did not rest it s d e ei ~ ion on <Ill independent sta te g round.
4
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room, including areas completely out of
reach of the arrestee .
Cf.
Chimel v.
California ,
39 5 U.S.
752,
763
(1969).
Rathe r,
with
appropriate
restrain t,
he
remained at the c1oor, enterin g no farther
than was necessa ry to kee
the arreste d
per son in v ie~v
It \vas only by chance tha
..e
offJcer,
from
this
vantage point ,
observed on a table what he believe d wa s
con t
band .
Nothing
i.n
the
Fourth
Amendme
prohibited the officer from being whe re he
was when he made the critical observation
in this case.
Accord ingly, we grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate
the
judgment of
the Supre me
Court of
Washington , and remand the case f or further
proceed i ng s
not
inconsistent with
this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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June 11, 1981

=-=ME=M=O=RA
= N.:..::D::. . :U:..:.M=---=T-=-0--=T=HE=--C=O::..:N.:..::F.:. : E=-=-RE
=.::.:N-=.C=E
Re:

No. 80-1349, Washington v. Chrisman

In response to the Chief Justice's circulation, I
should say that the Chief Justice previously asked me
whether I would be able to join his opinion if he made
essentially the same changes he proposes in his circulation.
I responded that the proposed changes did not overcome our
differences in this case, and I countered by suggesting that
the last two paragraphs of the opinion be modified to read
as follows:
"We believe the Supreme Court of Washington erred
in holding the officer had no right to stand in the
doorway.
That court concluded that the officer had
lawfully placed Over dahl under arrest and therefore
was permitted to follow him to his room. The Fourth
Amendment does not deny a police officer who lawfully
has taken a person into custody the authority to keep
"that
individual
in
sight.
The
absence
of
an
affirmative indication that a particular arrestee
might reach for a weapon, destroy evidence, or attempt
to escape does not vitiate that authority.
See
Penns y 1 van i a v • Mimms , 4 3 4 U. S • 1 0 6 , 1 0 9 -110 ( 19 7 7 ) ;
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-236
(1973).
Here, the officer did not, upon his arrival,
undertake a complete search of the room, including
areas completely out of reach of the arrestee.
Cf.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 742, 763
(1969).
Rather, with what seems to us appropriate restraint,
he stood in the doorway, proceeding no farther than
was necessary to keep the arrested person in view. It
was only by chance that, from this vantage point, the
officer observed on a table what he believed was
contraband.

Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
officer from being where he was when he made this
observation.
If the officer was 'in' the room we are
quite sure he was legally there; and if from that
vantage point he reasonably believed that what he saw
on the table was contraband, he could seize that
material without a warrant.
Our 'plain view' cases
,.r
·
·
te as much.
On the other lu1nd, if, he was not
r.111 W
~e room, th,g_ .E_],_a ~_v1 ew doc trii?e wou!d "" not ~ _
1 el
just'ify his entr ""'T nto t ne room even i f Pi e had
/--..~
pro a5 e cause to be 1eve
a
w
e saw was ~,_,;;,v
c~ warrantless entry would be proper only
if there were exigent circumstances, which may or may
not have been present in this case.
Accordingly, we
grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington and remand
the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion."

fJ

--7

As
I
understand
it,
the Chief Justice
found my
suggested revision unacceptable because it recognizes that
although an officer's lawful observations from outside a
dwelling may give him probable cause to believe that there
is incriminating evidence inside the dwelling, the plain
view doctrine alone does not justify a warrantless entry to
seize that evidence.
I would rather grant the petition for
a writ of certiorari and hear the case than join the ~
curiam with the Chief Justice's suggested revision.
I
believe the Washington Supreme Court would interpret the
Chief Justice's opinion as strongly suggesting that whether
or not the officer had "entered" the room by standing in the
doorway, the plain view doctrine alone permitted him to
seize these items without a warrant.

$

June 16, 1981

.t
PE:

.

1

·I

l
I

-I
I

No. 80-1349,

~~~hingto n

v. Chrisma n

I still would like to correc t the primary defec t of
t he washington Supreme Court's decision--i.e., its
holding that a polic e office r may not kee p an arrestee
i n sight--\dthout using the '' poor" fa cts o f th is case for
resolving , one way or another , whether a warran t i s
r equire d t o enter a dwelling when con t raban d i s se en in
"plain v i e w" from the outsi d e. Ther efore, I ....a.m.Jl-i.lli:_ng
to add a footnote expressly saying that other elements
of t he "pla in v i e w" doctrine remain unresolved in this
case. I am not willing, however, to go along with
Byron's proposed final paragraph, which, as I read it,
would decide that a warrant ordinarily is needed under
such circumstances. I continue to disagree with that
position, and Potter, Harry, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist
seemed to share my view.

Ir

I do not know how the Washington Supreme Court will
resolve this question, if Chrisman raises it. I still
am convinced that (a) we need not reach this issue in
this case and (b) we would be better off addressing it
in a case without so many factual problems.
Regards,
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1

C'FHI:\.l\1,

A ('[:.Inj)US police officer at \Ya.shington State rniversity
oLsc:rwd a male y ou th, Carl 0\·ercbhl, exit a studc,nt dormitory c.:Jrrying a half-ga1Jon bottle of gin. Beca use Wa shington b\\. forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by p ersons ·
under 21, ·wash. Rev. Code § 06.44.270/ and Overdahl app eared to be under age, the officer stopped him and asked for
inentificat ion. Overdahl replied that he would have to return to his room to obtain id entification. The officer accompanied him.=
The room was approxim ately 11 by 17 fe et and located on
the 11th floor of the dormitory. The respondent, Overdahl's
roommate, was in the roon1 when the officer and Overdahl
arrived. The officer remained in the doorway when Overdahl
went inside. The respondent became visibly nervous at the
sight of the officer.
\Vhile waiting, the officer observed seeds and a small pipe
lying on a table in the room. From his training and experience, he be1ieved the seeds were marihuana and the pipe was
of a type used to smoke marihuana. He then went over to
1 VniveJ:"ity r cgu bt .ion~ also forb :l<l(' po ;;~e~s ion of :-~ l coho lic brn•r3ges
on university prOJll'r1)'. Tr. 4, 34.
2 ·while w:1iting for the c-lt•vator, thl' officer ;,~kr d On•rd.1hl hi~ :-~gc.
On:rd:Jhl rrspondrd that hE' W:J::' 10. The rrsjlondl'n t clid not :trgup in
the IY:1o:hington cour1s or in his Brief in Oppo~ition here 1l1llt this admi:, !on e:~:1;1ill:l1rd tk· m·r.d for OnJCl::hl to jJrodmc icl l'ntiflcttio n and
th u~ im·:tlicb tcs thr Yi ~ it to ilH; room.

;r.,;

-

')

tLe bble and rxamined the S('<·ds 3lld the pipe more· <-l usdy.
The pipe smP.ll(·d of maril1uana.
The officer informed both stutlcnts of their rigl1ts unrler
l\firanda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1066), and ench indicated
11e was willing to waive those rights. The officer then a~ked
wlH:iher tl1ey had any other drugs. The respondent l1nmled
Lim three small pbstic bags containing m::.rihuana. At tlwt
l'·:•i,Jt. the officer called by radio fur :1!"~;~:,,,Jc· e. 0JJ<'r' :l '-'CC' c••ld officer had arriYed, the students were toJd a thorough
~- ~rc-h of the room \\·ould Le JH·c·<·".;ar:r. The t•ffic-crs <'X p1:::.:;:cd to the two st cclcnts that tll\:'Y ll;;rl 3ll :;:.J::·o]:;1" righ t
to insist that the offi<:ers first oht ai n a w:1Irflllt but tiwi 1l1ey
could consent t.o the search . The offic-ers :1lso infwJJwd tl1em
that any r·onsent would ha\'e to be Ynlu nt<>ry !'lnd they euuld
zefuse to consent. The rrspondent ilnd Owrdahl c-onf( rred
in whispers, then amJOU JJced that they would con~ent. ThP
~carch yielded more marihuana and a quantity of }y;:-l rgic
acid didhybmide (LSD).
An information c:J1arged the respondent ·with one count of
posse~sing more than 40 grams of marihuana and one of possessing LSD, both felonies UJlder ·wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401
(c) (current version at ·wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d)). 1
A pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room
was denied. The respondent was convicted after a bench
trial. On appeal. the lrashington Court of Appeals upheld
the search and affirmed. 24 W"ash. App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316
(1979) .
The Supreme Court of \Ya shii1gton reversed. 94 Wash. 2d
711, 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that. although the officer
properly ha.d placed Overdahl under arrest and followed him
to the dormitory room, he had no right t..o enter the room.
There was no indication that Overdahl might seize a weapon
or destroy evidence (the gin bottle). and. with the officer
blocking the only exit from the room, there was no possibility

.. i

._

~ On.-~ rda hl was trifd with the respondPnt. for po~Sl-'&iing marihuana and
olso was convicted. Thr charges :Jgainst him were dismis.~ed while th{'case was pending before the Suprrme Court. of Vi'a1'hington .
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ol es(·a pe. Bl'cause no £'). igtn t tilt UlJt."-\:lltce n·q!Ji rl"fl tllC
officer to enter the room and thus Yicw its interior, his ~r i z ure
of tlH-' seeds a nd the pipe did not fall within the "pl nin , ·iew"
exc:eption to the warrant requirem ent; tha t exc('pti on requires some prior justifica tion for thP of!icrr 's LeiJJg ,,·h ere he
sees t.he con t rab and. Jn addi t ion. b N:ause the r cS]!\;llclent
nn d 0 Yerdahl's consent tD the suh:::r·qu{'nt se:1rch of room was
;),(' f; ~:t Of n1c (>fficcr's in iti3.J f'Jilfy, J1i(· ('I>Jl ~ J {J l t;:Jl d J(Jl)il(.l
nuring tha t s~ ~Heh shou ld haYe Lc(•Ji s:J}•J •J (•::-\.d [i.~ \'.tll.<
Th rre Ju si iccs di~senk d. Tl1t·~· J \ }i( ' h i it wf'! .c:: f u1ly JT3 s ... JJ~b1e for a police ollir·c-r to h·l'J' On•d:,hl. 211 ::n ,·~ t•·t· . iL
si gll t. at all tiJnes . ineludill g while he C'JJtued thf lllOill. Tl1E·
uf!Jeer th erefore h ad a Jc·gitima'Le r~~SClll. in tJJ(' \ie\\· of tJ1~·
dissentPrs. for b eing in the pl aee ' ' lHn· ht: di:::covFrl'd Cvllt: nhalld in uplain view."

I

In our view , the Supreme Cour t of
Washi ng to n
e r r ed
in
holding
tha t
the
o f f icer ha d no right t o sta nd in t he
d oorway.
That court conc l uded that the
o f f icer, having lawfully p l aced Overdahl
u nder arrest, could follow him to his room.
!The Fourth
Amendment permits a
police
officer who lawfully has taken a per son
f i nto custody to keep that individual in
sight.
The absence of
an
affirmative
i n dication that the arreste e might reach
l f or a we apon, destroy evidence, or flee
does
not
vitiate
that authority.
See
P e nnsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414
u.s. 218, 234-236 (1974).
Here,
the
officer did not, upon his arrival, under4

AJthougb Art.. I, § 7 of ihe W11shington Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be disturbro in his private affairs, or l1is home inY:J ded, \lit.hout. authority of lnw," the c·ourt. n rve r C'itrci that provision.
lt rud rppt>a tedly refer to the Fonrth Amendment. :md ca.,;es <"Onstrui nlf'
it; t herefore it. is tl ear the court did not rest its d et:i~ i on on an ind ependent state ground .

.

..

-

take
a
complete
search
of
the
room,
including areas completely out of reach of
the arrestee.
Cf. Chimel v. California,
3 9 5 U. S • 7 5 2 , 7 6 3 ( 19 6 9 ) .
Ra the r , with
appropriate restraint, he remained at the
Iopen doorway, entering no farther than was
necessary to keep the arrested person in
view.
It was only by chance that the
officer from this vantage point--where he
was lawfully present- -observed on a table
\vhat he believed vms contraband.
Nothing
in
the
Fourth
Amendment
prohibited the officer from being where he
was when he made the critical observation
in thjs case.
Accordingly, we grant the
petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate
the
judgment of
the Supreme Court of
Washington, and remand the case for further
proceedings
not
inconsistent with
this
opinion. 5
It is so ordered.

!

S.Secause
the
Supreme
Court
of
Washington held that the officer had no
right to keep Overdahl in sight, it did not
examine any other requirements for a lawful
seizure under these circumstances.
These
issues are for the state courts to resolve
in the first instance.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

October 26, 1981

David Levi

No. 80-1349:

State of Washington v. Chrisman

Question Presented
Whether an Officer who is standing in the doorway of
an

arrestee's

contraband

room may enter

lying

the premises when he observes

in plain view

and

arrestee in sight?

Introduction

when

he

is

keeping

the

2.

The Court granted this petition after it was unable
to

agree

on

a

summary

reversal.

Chief.

Justice

prepared

by

the

dissent

then

a

Brennan,

White,

argument.

You
White

concurrence.

Ultimately

and

voted

Marshall

to

joined

a

first

percuriam

circulated

Justices
grant

a

Stevens,

and

set

for

The case has already received far more analysis and

attention from the Court than I fear it deserves.

I.

Facts and Decision Below

A.

Facts

On the evening of January 21, 1978, a campus police
Officer

saw

defendant

Overdahl

walk

out

of

a

dormitory at

Washington State University carrying a half-gallon bottle of
gin.

Because

minor,
Officer

and

state

because

law

forbids

Overdahl

stopped him and asked

possession of

appeared
for

to

be

alcohol by a
under

identification.

21,

the

Over dahl

replied that he would have to go upstairs to his room to get
the identification.

The Officer stated that he would have to

accompany him to the room.
Upon
Officer

arriving

followed

at

Overdahl

the 11th floor
down

the

of

hallway

the dorm,
to

his

the

room.

Overdahl pushed open the slightly ajar door and entered the
room

.

•'

while

the

Officer

remained

in

the

doorway .

3.

Overdahl'~ommate,

Neil Chrisman, respondent here, was in the

room and became visibly nervous at the sight of the Officer.
After watching the two students for a few minutes,
the Officer observed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk.
Suspecting that the seeds were marijuana and the pipe of the
type used to smoke marijuana, the Officer walked to the table
to investigate more closely.

The pipe smelled of marijuana.

From this point on,
Briefly,

the

Officer

read

the

the

facts are not essential.

two

roommates

their

rights,

received their permission to search the room, and discovered
more marijuana and a quantity of LSD.

The trial court denied

a motion to suppress this evidence, and Chrisman was convicted
on a two count indictment.

The court of appeals upheld the

search and affirmed.

B.

Decision By the Supreme Court of Washington

The supreme court of washington reversed.

The court

found that the plain view exception to the warrant requirement
would not justify the seizure of the pipe and seeds in this
case.

I(

\\

The plain view exception is available in two sorts of

situations: ~

it

permits

the

warrantless

seizure

of

incriminating evidence discovered in a search of an area for
other specified items pursuant to a valid warrant;

~ it

permits

discovered

the

warrantless

seizure

of

items

inadvertently after an intrusion otherwise excepted from the

'r

4

warrant requirement.
(1971}

0

0

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443

In either of the two situations,

the Officer must

have a prior justification for intrusion.
The court found no justification for the Officer's
intrusion into the room:
The record i 6 in conflict as to whether [the offier]
stood in the doorway and then entered the room or
whether, while in the doorway, he was in fact in the
room.
We need not, however, let the result be
determined by such niceties. The police Officer was
in the room at the time he observed the seeds and
pipe. The question is: Did he have a right to be
there?

Although Overdahl was placed under arrest outside of the dorm
and

continued

to

be

under

arrest

when

accompanied

by

the

Officer to the room, the fact of arrest alone did not give the
Officer the right to enter the room without a warrant.
------~------------~~-----------------------------

were

there

exigent

enter the room:

circumstances

requiring

the

Officer

Nor
to

there was no evidence that the Officer was in

any danger, that the bottle of gin was about to be destroyed,
or that Overdahl was about to flee.

Had the Officer not been

"in" the room--i.e. in the doorway--he would not have seen the
pipe and seeds, and the evidence must be suppressed.
this extreme holding, the Officer should have remained outside
the room with his back to the door.
The

three

dissenters

attacked

the

majority

for

failing to "explain convincingly •.. why the Officer was not

'

.

5.

entitled to keep the arrested person within his sight."
well

established

that

if

------

dwelling and asks to go to

-another
a

defendant

is

arrested

at

- ~
his

room the police may search
!

that room before or after granting the request.

v.

It is

Mason,

523

F.2d

1122,

Officer could have searched
right to enter it.

1126

(D.C.

the room,

Cir.

United States
1975).

If

the

he certainly had the

Similarly, it is well established that if

a defendant is arrested at his dwelling, and is permitted to
go

to

police

another
may

part

of

accompany

the
him

dwelling
and

any

for

some

evidence

purpose,

the

inadvertently

observed is admissible under the plain view doctrine.

United

States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1101 (CA2 1977).
In sum, the disagreement within the court below may
be

stated as

follows:

Absent exigent circumstances, does an

Officer have the right to accompany a person who has just been
arrested onto the arrestee's premises?

II.

A.

Analysis

The Colloquy Between the Chief and Justice White

The Chief's first draft held that:
the Fourth Amendment does not deny a police Officer
who lawfully has taken a person into custody the
authority to keep that individual in sight.
The
absence
of
an
affirmative
indiciation
that
a
particular arrestee might reach for a weapon or
attempt to escape does not vitiate that authority.

6.

See Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 u.s. 106, 109-110
{1977)
The Officer did not undertake a complete
search of the room
Rather, with appropriate
restraint, he remained at the door ... It was only be
chance that the Officer observed on a table what he
recognized at once to be contraband.
This is a
classic case of evidence found in plain view when a
police
Officerr,
for
unrelated
and
entirely
legitimate reasons, obtains access to someone's
privat area."

Thus, the Chief proposed to adopt the position of the dissent
below:
enter

An Officer
the

premises

may
in

keep

an

order

arrestee

to

do

in

sight,

Justices

so.

and

may

Powell,

Stewart, and Rehnquist joined.
Justice White dissented.

He argued that the Officer

had a right to stand in the doorway and had a right to observe
the

seeds and pipe

drugs,

the

Officer

from

that

vantage.

did

not

have

a

But having seen the
right

"to

enter

the

dormitory room without a warrant to examine and seize those
items."
that

a

He characterized the Chief's per curiam as holding
"warrantless

entry and

'plain view' doctrine."

seizure was

justified by the

Justice White's concern was that the

Court's holding would permit a police Officer who passes by
the open door of a dwelling and witnesses contraband to enter
the home and seize the evidence without a warrant.

-

points--! would say for

ll

\\

two errors.

that the Officer
drugs.

'•

Whereas

unlike the court
"in" the room when

the

court

below

did

not

7.

believe that the case should turn on such a "nicety," Justice

White

insists that

appears

to

opinion.
doctrine
Officer's

indeed it should. e 3 >ustice White

mischaracterize
That

opinion

justifies a
need

to

the

does

holding

not

hold

warrantless

maintain

of

the

per

that

the

plain

it

entry;

control

of

holds

curiam

that

person who has

view
the
been

arrested justifies entry.
In

response

added a footnote

to Justice White's dissent,

(footnote 5)

the Chief

to the effect that the Officer

was "in the room" when he stood in the doorway and second that
"exigent
Officer

circumstnces"
left

to

get

justified
a

the

warrant,

seizure

Chrisman

since

might

had

well

the
have

destroyed the evidence.
After the Chief was unable to get a sixth vote, he
re-wrote the per curiam in an effort to allay Justice White's
fear that the plain view doctrine was being extended.

In the

revision, the Court holds only that the Officer had a right to
keep a lawfully arrested person in sight regardless of whether
exigent

circumstances

existed.

observed the pipe and seeds.
the

pipe--because

he

was

Thus

the

Officer

properly

Whether he then properly seized

already

"in

the

exigent circumstances existed--would be for

room"

or

because

the state courts

to determine on remand.
Justice White was not mollified.

He had suggested

the following language which the Chief had not been willing to
include:

...

a.

"If the Officer was "in" the room we are quite sure
he was legally there;
and if from that vantage
point he reasonably believed that what he saqw on
the table was contraband, he could seize that
material without a warrant. On the other hand, if
he was not "in" the room, the plain view doctrine
would not itself justify his entry into the room
even if he had probable cause to believe that what
he saw was contraband. A warrantless entry would be
proper only if there were exigent circumstances,
which may or may not have been present in this
case."

The Chief would not include this paragraph becasue he did not
wish to decide on the peculiar facts here

whether the plain

view doctrine would or would not authorize a warrantless entry
when an Officer sees contraband inside a dwelling through an
open door or window.
Justic:_ w~~=-- di~ ift ~s posl.:.!- on, however'

----

the point of concurring in the judgment.
....

J_o

In his concurrence

he argued that the Officer was properly in the doorway and had
properly observed

the

pipe

and

seeds.

But

he

argued

the

Officer had not entered the room by simply standing in the
doorway and his warrantless entry into the room could not be
justified by the plain view doctrine.

The only justification

would be if the Officer had probable cause to believe that the
items were contraband and if exigent circumstances justified
an immediate seizure of the items.

Justice White opposed the

majority's holding that "as a matter of law ••• any police
Officer who stands in the open doorway of a home has "entered"
the home" because under such a rule the Officer might then

'•

~/(4)

9

"intrude

into

a

home

without

a

warrant

to

incriminating evidence or contraband that he
while

standing

Coolidge:

in

the

As

doorway."

"plain view alone

the

is never

warrantless seizure of evidence."

seize

0

any

is able to see
Court

enough to

stated

in

justify the

Justice White would remand

for a determination whether the__exigent circumstances existed
in this case.

B.

Resolving the Difference

The Court
case.

is

very close

to an agreement on

this

Apparently all of the Justices agree that the Officer

-

properly stood in the door and that he properly saw the seeds

...--------------

---~

and

the

pipe.

Significantly,

even

Justice

White

would

~

apparently agree that had it been necessary for the Officer to
take

a

couple

of

steps

into

the

room

in order

to maintain

Overdahl within sight, the Officer could have then picked up
the items under the plain view doctrine.
The Court may not be in agreement as to whether the
plain view doctrine itself permits a warrantless entry as, for
example, when an Officer sees contraband inside of a dwelling
through an open door.

At the least, the Chief is reluctant to

decide this question on these facts and in the setting of a
college dormitory.

And the Court is not in agremement as to

whether

is

doorway.

an Officer
Justice

"in"

White

the

fears

room when he
that

under

stands
such

a

in
view

the
a

10.

policeman who sells raffle tackets from the doorway will then
be able to march into the residence if he sees contraband from
the doorway without first obtaining a warrant and without any
exigent circumstances.
But I doubt that either of these two disagreements

~ significant
the Officer
arrested.

in the context of the facts of tis case.

was
As

accompanying a person whom he had
the

dissent

below

argued,

had

the

Here

lawfully
Officer

arrested Overdahl in his home and had Overdahl asked to go to

_

-

another room in __,__....,_....
the house, the Officer could have accompanied

-----

- -

him, could have seized anything in plain view, and could have
,.........,
searched the room both before and after the defendant was

-----------~------------~---------permitted
to go into it.
For his safety, the Officer must be
able

to maintain an

control

the

area

arrestee

around

in sight and must

the arrestee.

be able

The officer

in

to

this

case apparently believed that he could best maintain control
of the room and its two occupants by standing in the doorway.
In this setting, I think that the officer is "in" the room-whether he is in the doorway or two steps into the room--and
anything

the

exception.
is

officer

has

is

subject

to

the

plain

view

Certainly one's expectation of privacy in a room

considerably

officer

sees

lessened

taken

following

an

arrest

and

after

an

up a position from which he may view the

arrestee's every move and from which he may intervene if need
be.

This
contraband

does

through

not
an

mean

open

that

an

doorway

or

officer
who

who

stands

sees

in

the

doorway of a house would be given the same leeway to enter the
dwelling and seize items in plain view.
a

strong

argument

that

an

officer

I think one can make

who

sees

contraband--as

opposed to incriminating evidence--is seeing the perpetration
of a crime and may enter a dwelling to seize the contraband.
But the Court does not need to decide that question on this
case.
To accept Justice White's approach would involve the
Court in making the sort of artificial distinctions so common
already

to

the

taken

one

White

would

fourth

step

forward

decide

the

Thus

amendment.

if

when

accompanying

case

differently.

the officer
Overdahl,
Had

the

had

Justice
officer

needed to peer around a corner and so had come forward

into

the room, or had the table been by the door, the case might be
In this way the architecture of the room and the

different.

placement of the furniture would determine application of the
fourth amendment.
One
steps

into

a

could

argue

room

for

suspects are drugs
than

when

arrestee
three

the
and

response

the

purpose

the matter

officer
then

in

sees

problems with

steps
the

adopting

that
of

when

an officer

examining

what

he

should be treated differently
in

to maintain

drugs.
such a

won't be of any effect in reality:

But

control of

there

rule.

are

First,

at
the

the

least
rule

the officer will simply

J

12.

testify that he came
arrestee.

into the

room to

keep any eye on the

Second, such a rule "penalizes" officers who show

restraint

and

do

not

come

barging

into

the

In

room.

the

future officers will simply act in a more intrusive fashion to
begin with.
that

the

rather

And finally,

officer

than

suspicious
difference
content
maintain

was

the distinction hinges on the fact

standing

at

the

entrance of

just

inside

the

threshhold

items.

That

the

case

seems

to

to make

stand

control

at

from

arrestee's every move.

should
If

little sense.

the

doorway

that

when

it

was

vantage

and

the

he

turn

room

saw

the

on

this

the Officer was
because

he

could

could

see

the

In these circumstances the officer is

every bit as much "in" the room as if he had taken a couple of
steps forward.
has occurred

In either case the intrusion has occurred, and
lawfully,

while

the expectation of privacy has

been destroyed.
I'-

-

""

;

.

'-

,,

In sum, it is the factor of a lawful arrest that so
distinguishes this case.

By holding that an officer who has

-----------------------

placed a person under arrest may accompany that person into
his dwelling and into any room in to which he goes,
holding
view,

that

the

officer

may

then

seize

anything

and by

in plain

I do not think that the Court is creating an exception

to the warrant requirement that should trouble Justice White.
Such a holding comports with commonsense and the purposes of
the

plain view

which

an

exception,

officer

sees

and

does

contraband

'

.

not decide

through

the

case

an open door

in
but

13.

where no arrest has been made.

That question can wait for a

less idiosyncratic set of facts.
Of

course

officer could

the

stand at

Court

could

hold

the doorway and

simply

look

that

the

into the room.

That was the Chief's approach in his second effort and such a
holding is enough to vacate and remand.

It would then be left

to the state courts on remand to decide if there were exigent
circumstances justifying the seizure of the items or whether
the

fact

that

the

officer

was

maintaining

watch

over

an

arrestee permitted him to enter the room without a warrant and
regardless of whether exigent circumstances existed.

III.

A.

Arguments of the Parties

Chrisman

Chrisman makes many of the arguments Justice White
has made.
can

be

In addition,

understood

to

he suggests that the decision below
rely

on

the

state

constitution

and

therefore rests upon an independent and adequate state ground.
But Chrisman has no evidence of such a basis except for a few
citations
opinion

in

the

relies

opinion to state cases.
heavily

upon

decisions

By contrast,
of

this

Court

the
and

nowhere indicates that its holding is one of state law.
Chrisman also argues that the officer had no right
to ask Overdahl for
of his rights.

identification without first advising him

The act of giving the identification to the

14.

officer

would

offense

of

have

possession

argument does
argument

been

has

a
of

not appear
any

testimonial

act

alcohol

a

to have

validity,

and

by

relevant

minor.

been raised

But

below;

if Chrisman has

to

the
this

if the

standing

to

make it, it can be offered on remand.
Finally, Chrisman argues that there were no exigent
circumstances requiring the officer to act immediately without
a warrant.

the officer was in

The room was under control;

communication via walkie-talkie with other officers who could
have aided him in maintaining the status quo while a warrant
was obtained.
B.

The State

In addition to arguing that

the fact of an arrest

permitted the officer to enter the room, the state argues that
there

were

enter

the

with

exigent

circumstances

room and

Justice

observation

White
of

the

seize
that

requiring

the

the contraband.
at

drugs,

the
he

time

was

not

the

The

officedr

state agrees

officer

"in"

to

the

made

room.

his
But

Overdahl had left the door open, giving the officer a view of
the room and

removing any expectation of privacy.

The room

was in "open view" and the officer was entitled to look in.
Seeing the drugs,
the

likelihood

officer

and

that

properly

in view of Chrisman's nervousness and
the

entered

circumstances exception.
obtain

• J

a

warrant

contraband

in

the

would

room

be

under

detroyed,
the

the

exigent

The officer could not have left to
these

circumstances.

Moreover,

the

15.

suggestion that the officer should have called for
maintained
itself

control of

have

required

the
a

premises

continuing

pending

a

help and

warrant would

invasion of

privacy

could only be justified by exigent circumstances.

that

The officer

would have had to require that the door remain open and the
occupants remain under his direct control.
for

the

fourth

protecting

the

amendment;
evidence

the

was

least

for

the

This is no triumph

intrusive
officer

to

method

of

seize

it

immediately.
It may
successfully

well

show

be

that

there

justifying the seizure.
held,

although

the

that

on

a

were

remand

the

exigent

state could
circumstances

The intermediate appellate court so

state

supreme

court

did

not

reach

the

question since it found that the officer should not have been
at the doorway looking into the room in the first place.

IV.

Conclusion

The Court may vacate and remand this case on either
of two grounds:

1.
an

arrested

within sight.
curiam.

The Court may hold that an officer may accompany
person

to

his

dwelling

and

keep

the

arrestee

This was the Chief's approach in his second per

On remand the lower court must decide whether exigent

circumstances justified the officer's entry into the room and

16.

seizure of

the

i terns or whether

the

fact

that Overdahl was

under arrest justified the officer's entry into the room.

2.

The

Court

may

hold

that

when

an

officer

accompanies an arrested person to his dwelling, and takes up a
position

from which

he can watch

control of the situation,

the arrestee and maintain

he may seize any contraband items

that he can see from his vantage point.

This was the Chief's

approach in his first opinion.

I think either approach would be proper.
has

the

guidance.

advantage of caution;

the

The first

second of providing more
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1349
WASHINGTON, PETITIONER v.
NEIL MARTIN CHRISMAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF WASHINGTON
[November-, 1981]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to consider whether a police officer
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, accompany an
arrested person into his residence and seize contraband
discovered there in plain view.
I
On the evening of January 21, 1978, Officer Daugherty of
the Washington State University police department observed Carl Overdahl, a student at the University, leave a
student dormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. Because Washington law forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under 21, Wash. Rev. Code §66.44.270, and
Overdahl appeared to be under age, 1 the officer stopped him
and asked for identification. Overdahl said that his identification was in his dormitory room and asked if the officer
would wait while he went to retrieve it. The officer answered that under the circumstances he would have to ac'In addition, University regulations prohibit possession of alcoholic beverages on University property. Tr. 4, 34. At the suppression hearing,
Officer Daugherty testified that, because of these regulations, he would
have stopped Overdahl without regard to his age. Tr. 10.
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company Overdahl, to which Overdahl replied "O.K."
Overdahl's room was approximately 11 by 17 feet and located on the 11th floor of the dormitory. Respondent Chrisman, Overdahl's roommate, was in the room when the officer
and Overdahl entered. The officer remained in the open
doorway, leaning against the doorjamb while watching Chrisman and Overdahl. He observed that Chrisman, who was in
the process of placing a small box in the room's medicine cabinet, became nervous at the sight of an officer.
Within 30 to 45 seconds after Overdahl entered the room,
the officer noticed seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk 8 to
10 feet from where he was standing. From his training and
experience, the officer believed the seeds were marijuana
and the pipe was of a type used to smoke marijuana. He entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds, confirming
that the seeds were marijuana and observing that the pipe
smelled of marijuana.
The officer informed Overdahl and Chrisman of their rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966); each acknowledged that he understood his rights and indicated that
he was willing to waive them. Officer Daugherty then asked
whether the students had any other drugs in the room. The
respondent handed Daugherty the box he had been carrying
earlier, which contained three small plastic bags filled with
marijuana and $112 in cash. At that point, Officer Daugherty called by radio for a second officer; on his arrival, the
two students were told that a search of the room would be
necessary. The officers explained to Overdahl and Chrisman that they had an absolute right to insist that the officers
first obtain a search warrant, but that they could voluntarily
consent to the search. Following this explanation, which
was given in considerable detail, the two students conferred
in whispers for several minutes before announcing their consent; they also signed written forms consenting to the search
of the room. The search yielded more marijuana and a quantity of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), both controlled
substances.

,I
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Respondent was charged with one count of possessing
more than 40 grams of marijuana and one of possessing LSD,
both felonies under Wash. Rev. Code§ 69.50.401 (c) (current
version at Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (d) (Supp. 1981)). A
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized in the room
was denied; respondent was convicted of both counts. On
appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the validity of the search. 24 Wash.
App. 385, 600 P. 2d 1316 (1979).
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. 94 Wash. 2d
711, 619 P. 2d 971 (1980). It held that, although Overdahl
had been placed under lawful arrest and "there was nothing
to prevent Officer Daugherty from accompanying Overdahl
to his room," the officer had no right to enter the room and
either examine or seize contraband without a warrant. The
court reasoned there was no indication that Overdahl might
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence, and, with the officer
blocking the only exit from the room, his presence inside the
room was not necessary to prevent escape. Because the officer's entry into the room and his observations of its interior
were not justified by "exigent circumstances," the seizure of
the seeds and pipe were held not to fall within the plain view
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
The court went on to hold that because the students' consent
to the subsequent search of the room was the fruit of the officer's initial entry, the contraband found during that search
should also have been suppressed. 2
Three Justices dissented. They concluded it was reasonable for a police officer to keep an arrested person in sight at
all times; accordingly, the officer had a legitimate reason for
' Although Art. I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law," the court never cited that provision. It did repeatedly refer to the Fourth Amendment and cases construing it. While
respondent urges that we "treat the case as having been decided under the
Washington Constitution," it is clear that the court did not rest its decision
on an independent state ground.

,..
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being in the place where he discovered the contraband, and
was entitled, under the plain view doctrine, to seize it.
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1981), and reverse.
II
A

The "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize
what clearly is evidence or contraband when it is discovered
in a place where the officer has a right to be. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United
States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968). Here, the officer had placed
Overdahl under lawful arrest, and was therefore authorized
to accompany him to his room for the purpose of obtaining
identification. 3 The officer had a right to remain literally at
Overdahl's elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is to the contrary.
The central premise of the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Washington is that Officer Daugherty was not entitled to acThe trial court found that it was Overdahl who proposed to retrieve
the identification, and, after being informed that Officer Daugherty would
have to accompany him, agreed to the officer's presence. Respondent
nevertheless claims that Overdahl was "coerced" to return to the room in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, because he was in custody and had not
yet been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426
(1966). He argues that since identification would serve as proof of Overdahl's age-an element of the offense for which he had been arrested-the
officer could not ask him for this "incriminating" evidence without first advising him of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.
Assuming, arguendo, that Overdahl's Fifth Amendment rights were violated in some fashion, this does not vitiate the legality of his arrest, nor
does it undercut the officer's right to maintain custody over an arrested
person. The failure to give "Miranda warnings" might preclude introduction of incriminating statements made by Overdahl while in custody; but no
such statements are even peripherally involved in this case. The act of
going to the room was neither "incriminating" nor a "testimonial communication." Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408-414 (1976).
3

I I
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company Overdahl from the public corridor of the dormitory
into his room, absent a showing that such "intervention" was
required by "exigent circumstances." We disagree with this
novel reading of the Fourth Amendment. The absence of an
affirmative indication that an arrested person might have a
weapon available or might attempt to escape does not diminish the arresting officer's authority to maintain custody over
the arrested person. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. 106, 109-110 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218, 234-236 (1974). Nor is that authority altered by
the nature of the offense for which the arrest was made.
Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger
to the arresting officer. Cf. United States v. Robinson,
supra, at 234 n. 5. There is no way for an officer to predict
reliably how a particular subject will react to arrest or the
degree of the potential danger. Moreover, the possibility
that an arrested person will attempt to escape if not properly
supervised is obvious. Although the Supreme Court of
Washington found little likelihood that Overdahl could escape
from his dormitory room, an arresting officer's custodial authority over an arrested person does not depend upon a reviewing court's after-the-fact assessment of the particular arrest situation. Cf New York v. Belton, --U.S. - - ,
- - (1981); United States v. Robinson, supra, at 235.
We hold, therefore, that it is not "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his
judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer's need
to ensure his own safety-as well as the integrity of the arrest-is compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual
who has been arrested. 4
• Indeed, were the rule otherwise, it is doubtful that an arrested person
would ever be permitted to return to his residence, no matter how legitimate the reason for doing so. Such a rule would impose far greater re-
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It follows that Officer Daugherty properly accompanied
Overdahl into his room, and that his presence in the room
was lawful. With restraint, the officer remained in the doorway momentarily, entering no farther than was necessary to
keep the arrested person in his view. It was only by chance
that, while in the doorway, the officer observed in plain view
what he recognized to be contraband. Had he exercised his
undoubted right to remain at Overdahl's side, he might well
have observed the contraband sooner.
B

Respondent nevertheless contends that the officer lacked
authority to seize the contraband, even though in plain view,
because he was "outside" the room at the time he made his
observations. The Supreme Court of Washington noted that
"[t]he record is in conflict as to whether Officer Daugherty
stood in the doorway and then entered the room or whether,
while in the doorway, he was in fact in the room." It concluded, however, that it "need not ... let the result be determined by such niceties," and assumed for purposes of its decision that the officer "was in the room at the time he observed
the seeds and pipe." We agree that on this record "such
niceties" are not relevant. It is of no legal significance
whether the officer was in the room, on the threshold, or in
the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places
as an incident of a valid arrest.
Respondent's argument appears to be that, even if the officer could have stationed himself "inside" the room had he
done so immediately upon Overdahl's entry, his 30- to 45-second hesitation was fatal; and that having chosen to remain in
the doorway, the officer was precluded from proceeding further to seize the contraband. We reject this contention.
Respondent's argument, if accepted, would have the perverse effect of penalizing the officer for exercising more restrictions on the personal liberty of arrested individuals than those occasioned here.

t

0$1349A, 11-231-81, rev. Drb

80-134~PINION

WASHINGTON v. CHRISMAN

7

straint than was required under the circumstances. Moreover, it ignores the fundamental premise that the Fourth
Amendment protects only against unreasonable intrusions
into an individual's privacy. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389
u. s. 347 (1967).
The "intrusion" in this case occurred when the officer,
quite properly, followed Overdahl into a private area to a
point from which he had unimpeded view of and access to the
area's contents and its occupants. His right to custodial control did not evaporate with his choice to hesitate briefly in the
doorway rather than at some other vantage point inside the
room. It cannot be gainsaid that the officer would have had
unrestricted access to the room at the first indication that he
was in danger, or that evidence might be destroyed-or even
upon reassessment of the wisdom of permitting a distance between himself and Overdahl.
We therefore conclude that, regardless of where the officer
was positioned with respect to the threshold, he did not abandon his right to be in the room whenever he considered it essential. Accordingly, he had the right-and duty-to act as
soon as he observed the seeds and pipe. 5 This is a classic
instance of evidence found in plain view when a police officer,
for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons, obtains access
to an individual's area of privacy. The Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit seizure of evidence of criminal conduct
found in these circumstances. 6

III
6
The circumstances of this case distinguish it totally from one in which
an officer, chancing by an open doorway to a residence, observes what he
believes to be contraband inside. We therefore need not consider what, if
any, added constraints are placed on an officer's ability to enter a residence
to seize contraband in such a situation.
6
In light of our disposition, we need not decide whether, as the Washington Court of Appeals held, the likelihood that the contraband would be
destroyed constituted an "exigent circumstance" independently justifying
the officer's entry into the room.
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Since the seizure of the marijuana and pipe was lawful, we
have no difficulty concluding that this evidence and the contraband subsequently taken from respondent's room was
properly admitted at his trial. Respondent voluntarily produced three bags of marijuana after being informed of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 426 (1966). He
then consented, in writing, to a search of the room, after being advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he
had an absolute right to refuse consent and demand procurement of a search warrant. The seizure of the drugs pursuant
to respondent's valid consent did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 7
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered .

•

7
We reject as utterly frivolous the respondent's contention that, on the
facts presented here, Officer Daugherty was required to knock and announce his presence at the doorway prior to entering the room.
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